



Uncertainty of the prosperous of local fishers in Bone district: Challenging social protection and unregulated maritime policies

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ABSTRACT

There are arguments that the welfare-state provision in Indonesia was following universalism paradigm. However, there are controversies surrounding social services and prosperity in which some people think that the welfare regimes have not affected certain individuals including Indonesian fishers. Concerning on this argument, the paper seeks to re-examine the social protection and unregulated maritime policies in which Bone District, South Sulawesi, has cases to encourage the chance of searching new model of welfare-state production for local fishers. The study used qualitative methods with a phenomenological approach. The researchers conducted observation, interviews, and desk review to gain the flourishing data. Findings reveal that the local fishers are dealing with uncertainty in terms of their prosperity because of several factors namely economic monopoly, power relations, and unregulated fishing. The findings imply protecting the rights of vulnerable groups, particularly the local fishers, should be integrated to the system of welfare provision so that they can achieve prosperity.

1. Introduction.

The question this paper aims to answer is whether the local fishers' have achieved prosperity out of Indonesia's marine potential. Therefore, it is highly interesting to examine local fishers using a phenomenological approach to their experiences in Bone District, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Their experiences are interesting to study because the seafaring tradition has existed since the Bone Kingdom era in twelve century, as indicated by the existence of an ancient maritime law called Amana Gappa (Alonso et al., 2015; Ansar et al., 2019). Furthermore, Tanete Riattang Timur Subdistrict was selected, as it is considered unique and specific in terms of survival strategies based on Bajoe Tribe's experiences. However, the local fishers have not acquired the right of welfare provision. Data shows that there are approximately 12,831 Bone fishers, who managed to

catch 54.67 tons of fish in 2021. Such circumstances have yet to translate into prosperity of the locals because there is a disparity in benefit between the boat owners and local fishers' (Raodah, 2014). The income of the area is predicted to be around IDR 1.2 billion, but it has not reached the locals, nor has it improved their well-being—on the contrary, the fishers live in poverty (Aji et al., 2021; UNICEF et al., 2021). This condition is affected by determinant factors, namely political hegemony, disparities in economic policy, and patrimonial legacy (Wisnumurti, 2009). Moreover, works of previous scholar's highlight that the fishers are living under the poverty line because of lifestyles, low quality of human resources, and incapability to diversify fishing catch. Based on these assumptions, the study seeks to re-examine local fishers' prosperity in Bone from the perspective of social protection and maritime policy that have caused the fishers' prosperity to reach a state of uncertainty.

Studies on Indonesian maritime policies are extensive, and scholars continuously present Indonesia's maritime axis issues as a part of developmental studies. To begin with, the researchers have been mapped past studies on several topics. Many researchers have so far focused on the socio-economic and socio-political aspects of and trade in the Silk Road (Frankel, 2016;

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Jayasuriya, 2008; Zuhdi, 2018). Furthermore, the researchers also collected some issues on the maritime history, religion, local culture, and social transformation (Knaap & Sutherland, 2004; Máñez & Ferse, 2010; Mejías-Balsalobre et al., 2021; Sultani et al., 2019). Rochwulaningsih et al. (2019) showed the failure of Indonesian government within the marine sector as the main of development sources to significantly increase economic wealth. They presented an analysis showing the lack of fishers' adaptation to technological innovation. Another portrait of maritime issues is that there are contestations about political hegemony and local fishers, in which the government protects the oligarchic actors more than local people (Sulistyo, 2020). On the other hand, government policies in maritime issues have only covered the macro scale, but has yet to include micro analysis for local prosperity—both should equally be considered (Lauder & Lauder, 2016; Rozaki, 2022; Suseto et al., 2019). The current study the maritime and prosperity problems that should determine on welfare-state provision from various interdisciplinary approaches.

Globally, maritime issues were underlined by mostly scholars around the globe that discussed the Silk Road in contemporary era. Likewise, Sampson et al. (2022) and Mack (2007) revealed that marine resources will give the welfare provision when managed with optimal supervision for fishers' prosperity. In line with that, Saeed et al. (2021), Lee (2018), and Valentine et al. (2013) explored maritime issues, in which the trade and domestic production need the backbone of the international road. In contrast, the prosperity of local fishers is still restricted within a global of convention of labor as a part of the maritime industry (Doumbia-Henry, 2020; Jo et al., 2020; Mantoju, 2021; Wu, 2004). Employees in maritime companies have been given attention to increase their prosperity and social protection by themselves behind the regulation of welfare regimes (Slišković & Juranko, 2019; Thomas et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2006). Concerning the welfare-state notion for fishing workers, it is companies' obligation to fulfill the basic rights. It is different for fishers from outside of the cruise industry, indeed, because they have not been included into the social protection as employees. McKinsey Global Institute, for example, predicted that fishing and maritime industries will give advantages for the social development sectors, bringing Indonesia to become a developed countries by 2030 (Oberman et al., 2012). It should be at least converted to increasing the local fishers' prosperity. However, the universalist paradigm as a notion of welfare production does not sound a signal to protect fishing workers as part of vulnerable groups. In doing so, to complement existing studies; this research seeks to re-examine the social protection model of fishers within the universalist welfare policy.

Analyzing these, the study presents at understanding of social welfare for local fishers in Bone amid the marine sector. Specifically, the research exposes three important issues. First, it explores the challenges faced by local fishers in their activities. This has become a representative problem in line with the maritime policy and welfare-state production. Second, it provides an alternative way of understanding sea policies in Bone area, which seek to reformulate the development of local fishers' prosperity. Third, it investigates the realities of life of local

Bone fishers. They represent the survival strategy and well-being based on locality. As such, this study is relevant as it explores local fishers' circumstances mapped into challenges and welfare policies directly.

2. The Need for Local Fishers the Social Protection.

Numerous studies have been carried out by scholars around the world who considered marine policy as a part of welfare-state provision (e.g., Ariza-Montes et al., 2021; Mantoju, 2021; Sampson et al., 2022). Nevertheless, most scholarly works on this topic studied the fishers within the maritime industry, which is a subject of fisher in the convention of international labor (Frey & Osborne, 2017; Harrison & Sanders, 2014). It reflects a good practice that the scheme of social protection for fishing workers is included under obligated of companies (Bolt & Lashley, 2015; Doumbia-Henry, 2020). Even though the social welfare has been provided to all workers, it has not reached those in informal sectors. In debates surrounding this issue, vulnerable groups that are uncovered within the formal scheme should be provided easier access to get the basic rights through-out a social security program. For instance, in developed countries, there is social security provided within the universalist paradigm in the welfare-state production (Göçmen, 2014; Moresová et al., 2020; Petmesidou, 2013).

Responding to these arguments, in several developed countries, social protection has metamorphosed from a basic individual need to fulfill into a basic need for families (Eseed, 2018; OECD, 2019; Sander et al., 2012). Other variants of the model reflect the shifting paradigm on implementing social security, as it has also covered basic needs in various social groups. For instance, in European countries in general, social protection has covered for the groups at risk, such as homeless, aging population, children, women, and other vulnerable groups (Chilipenok et al., 2020; Hladikova & Hradecky, 2007; Kourachanis, 2019; Walsh, 2016). In addition, in Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and China, also have replicated social protection to refuge the violence victims, in which all countries are apply the social assistance included to the welfare-state regimes (Kim, 2008; Sukenari, 2019; Sumarto, 2020). Additionally, the shifting paradigm about 'jobless' and 'homeless' has produced a new insight in formulating the social policies, in which both discourses create a new distinctive of protection model between the assurance security of employment and housing program (Montgomery et al., 2020; Speak, 2013). As such, these safety systems in many countries have shifted towards the developmentalist perspective, namely covering the basic needs of individuals, families, and the wider public.

In comparison to the social policies in developed countries, the researchers had undiscovered the best practices of protecting fishing workers as a part of vulnerable groups within the mechanism of welfare-state production in the developing country context, such as Indonesia. That is to say, most fishing workers have social services integrated to the international labor conventions while the informal labor sectors are not included in these security systems (Doumbia-Henry, 2020; International Labour Organization (ILO), 2020). Regarding to lim-

itation of previous studies, this study presents as an alternative of ‘a new synthetic theory’ within the residual paradigm on the welfare-states. Regarding Indonesia’s welfare-state system, the residual model is suitable to accommodate of local fishers in the social protection system. Moreover, the presence of social institutions or Indonesian Fishers Organizations should be able to become a social capital to safeguard these communities—contrary to previous studies which stated they are not included in the social security with universalist values in the protection models. Social services should be provided by social institutions to implement the different types of social security system that reflected the basic needs of local fishers. This model has currently adopted by many developed countries, such as the United States, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, to guarantee social welfare for groups at risk including fishing workers (Castel & To, 2012; Fisk & Reddy, 2020).

As noted above, there is still little attention given to social protection in the welfare-state discourses in specific comments about local fishers in Indonesia. This is true because so far, social security only accommodates some groups, such as vulnerable women, persons with disabilities, aging population, children, and jobless persons. Even though the individuals are many problems alongside the fishing workers, in which they reached more difficult to get the social security nets. As a result, social security such as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) (Sumarto, 2021), healthcare programs (Yuda, 2019a; Yuda & Rezza, 2021), the village fund (Handayani & Badrudin, 2019; Syafingi et al., 2020; Zakiyah, 2011), and other programs are still particular and segmented, and there is limited commitment to social citizenship. The intensive involvement of political oligarchs within the rudimentary democracy has influenced policymakers in formulating social protection policies for certain communities (Winters, 2013). As such, the government’s absence in fishing workers’ protection is a form of state failure to implement a good practice of social care to reduce the manipulation of power and the political hegemony.


Reflecting on the existing studies, this paper will offer the new mechanism into protecting local fishers, in which it did not accommodate within the social welfare production. For this reason, the research selected the issues of local fishers to describe a survival strategy as the facts and phenomena in the context of welfare regime. The researchers consider to the topic because many fishers are excluded in social welfare, unlike other vulnerable groups in Indonesia. Moreover, this study has still relevance to see of local fishers within uncertainty of prosperity, unregulated of maritime policies and the power relations in fishing business. Such issues will be explored in the current research with consideration of previous investigations to find the solution of welfare regimes for fishing workers.

3. Materials and Methods .

3.1. Study area descriptions.

Figure 1 shows that Bone District and Tanete Riattang Timur Subdistrict are one of popular areas in Sulawesi Island because they are the best maritime sectors, celebrating traditional fishers and fishing in trap. This area has a beach line approximately

Figure 1: Study area map.



Source: Authors.

138 kilometers-long, while the sea area reaches around 93,929 Ha. The number of local fishers projected is more or less 12,831 people. In addition, boats and tools for fishing catch are predicted to be around 5.115 units. In this area, the local activities also supported by ice companies of 6 units, 3 units of fuel for seafaring, 3 units of cold storage, and one location as a fish market. The data shows that the performance of fishers’ productivity has increased significantly for various kinds of fish every year—44.6 tons in 2017, 45.7 tons in 2018, 48.3 tons in 2018, 48.3 tons in 2019, 49.5 tons in 2020, and 54.7 tons in 2021. The catch is predicted to amount to IDR 1.3 billion between 2017 and 2021. As such, all items have supported local fishers’ activities in line with the Bone as unique area to conduct of research about welfare regimes.

Another reason to conduct research in the area is that there are local strategies for survival of life that are popular in the countryside. The Bone communities are divided into three. First, this area is a place for the Bajoe tribe, in which they are staying by the sea. In general, they still earn income from marine resources. Second, it is an area famous for its port, Waetuo, as the location for ships to carry agriculture and commercial products. Third, it has become a home for many fishers who are fulfilling basic needs with the advantage of catching fish in Bone Sea. As such, the wealth of natural resources is at least a reason why this study should be carried out to explore the mechanism of social welfare in unique and specific locality in depth.

3.2. Type of research.

The study starts from the understanding that many researchers using qualitative methods to study the welfare of fishers have often failed to justify the interpretivist paradigms. To respond to such criticism, this research presents an alternative way to portray subjective norms and existing social realities. For that, this research applied the phenomenological approach according to Smart (2000), which sees a social phenomenon in four atti-

tudes: looking for the phenomenon emphatically, comparing each occurring social phenomenon, including the worldviews about social services for fishers, and using polymethodism to understand the phenomenon. Emphatic attitudes are relevant with worldviews to interpret the social care for local fishers. Comparison in relation to social protection gives an explanation of the best practices for social assistance. Worldviews are related to universalist values on fishers's prosperity. Polymethodism emphasizes understanding of uncertainty in prosperity for local people. As such, the four attitudes help researchers in justifying the interpretivist paradigms as part of a new meaning in understanding the phenomenon of fishers' welfare provision.

3.3. Data collection.

The data collection was carried out in three steps. Firstly, we carried out non-participant observation to respond a new phenomenon in social protection in Bone District. This observation was conducted to closely look at the actual conditions related to locals' prosperity and sea activities. Despite the non-participant technique, the researchers kept clean to the locals to let them know that research was being conducted. The researchers observed how the fishers caught fish, how they interacted among themselves, and how they interacted with local communities and others. The observation took place in the fishing market, local government office, fisher association office, and residence of the Bajoe tribe—which is also known as the fishers' kampong. The observation process was intensively noted, coupled with the use of voice notes, to look for unique evidence. Such a process took approximately two months, from October to November 2022. For this observation, the researchers did not stay at all times in the locations. The researchers then used the field notes as preliminary data to map out the research topics so that they would be in line with the study's purposes.

Secondly, the researchers interviewed the participants used a purposive sampling based on Silverman and Patterson (2022, p. 75). The participants were categorized into five identifiers: Local Government (LG), Local Fishers (LS), Fishmonger (FM), Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) activist (NA), and Local Communities (LC). The researchers conducted interviews within fifteen participants in total (see **Table 1**). They divided the questions into three main topics: how the social protection challenges impacted local fishers, why the maritime policies have been unable to handle social care for local residents, and whether fishers have locality-based survival strategies. All researchers were actively involved in the interviews. Interviews conducted with LG were aimed at getting information about social services for local fishers. In addition, the researchers were involved in the participants' daily activities to understand of their experiences. The researchers also interviewed fishmongers, which added more information about selling fish. Meanwhile, the activists from NGOs shared information about the advocacy process in protecting fishers. Interviews with local communities contributed stories about social safety nets to strengthen families' protection. Most interviews were carried out in October 2022, with some additional interviews in November 2022. Interviews lasted between 25 minutes and an hour and

a half. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed after getting permission from all participants. We were helped by four assistant researchers to transcribe the interviews data. All participants are marked with initials to maintain confidentiality.

Table 1: Statistical data of Interviewees.

No.	Identifiers	Initial	Age	Sex	Duration interviews (minutes)	Date interviews	Interview location
1.	LG	Atik	54	Female	54	10/10/2022	Social Services Office
2.	LG	Asna	46	Female	52	10/10/2022	Fishing Office
3.	LG	Andi	52	Male	115	11/10/2022	Manpower Office
4.	LG	Sabari	30	Male	25	12/10/2022	Village Office
5.	LS	Ahsan	42	Male	120	14/10/2022	Beach
6.	LS	Kahar	30	Male	30	15/10/2022	Beach
7.	LS	Rahman	45	Male	48	16/10/2022	Beach
8.	LS	Askar	42	Male	38	17/10/2022	Beach
9.	FM	Jasmi	40	Female	27	7/11/2022	Bajoe Kampong
10.	FM	Uba	36	Male	45	8/11/2022	Beach
11.	NA	Rasyid	46	Male	43	9/11/2022	Coffe Shop
12.	NA	Cahaya	30	Female	58	10/11/2022	Collages
13.	NA	Febi	28	Male	110	11/11/2022	Collages
14.	LC	Haji	46	Male	30	12/11/2022	Home
15.	LC	Idris	66	Male	50	13/11/2022	Village Office

Source: Authors.

Lastly, the researchers collected statistical data to back up interviews and observations in line with understanding of the number of fish catch from 2017 to 2021, as well as the number of fishers, number of boats, and actual condition of funds for welfare services in Bone District. The statistics were validated directly with the government authorities, which is a form of triangulation to confirm data validity and reliability. All local offices were visited to validate data; they include the social affairs office, fisheries office, labor office, and local government office of Bone. Furthermore, the researchers used government policies, especially regarding the mechanism of protection and welfare of fishers. They also analyzed policy briefs on Indonesian maritime issues before determining the validity study. Other materials included field notes, journals, books, and research reports on local fisher issues in Bone District. All documents provided legitimate proof of policies designed to protect local fishers who have been facing challenges on social welfare and unregulated maritime policies.

3.4. Data analysis.

The data analysis began shortly after determining the research topic. This process makes it different from quantitative method, which places analysis as the last step in the process study following data collection. The data analysis in this study was divided into five steps: recording, horizontalization, cluster of meaning, essential description, and interpretation. Recordings were transcribed into Microsoft Word and then the transcriptions were categorized according to similarity of the topics. Horizontalization is an inventorization data process through statements of all participants to make relevant categorization. This process avoided subjective norms regarding the data availability. Cluster of meaning was denoted to clarify data in partic-

ipants' expressions. Subsequently the researchers have all the data to interpret, select, categorize, and summarize. Next, the researchers wrote manuscripts, which included all field work data, which was consistently validated through triangulation to check the credibility and reliability. The verification also involved revisits to the study location when there was unsound information.

4. Findings.

4.1. Social Protection Challenges for Local Fishers.

Nowadays, based on the field work experiences, we discovered the social security uncertainty for local fishers in Bone District. It is the controversies of welfare-state provision versus social services implemented by the government through-out Smart Indonesia Card (*Kartu Indonesia Pintar – KIP*) and Health Insurance (*Kartu Indonesia Sehat – KIS*). Although the universalist security system has been regulated under welfare regimes, there are programs that have not reached the local fishers. As stated by Ahsan in his interview, 'I never received social security. Even my family has difficulty accessing welfare programs.' On the other hand, the education system for the children of fishers is isolated and segmented. For instance, there is a Fisheries Polytechnic in Bone, but it is hard for children of the local fishers to be admitted there. Rasyid said that 'the high cost of education makes the fishers reluctant to send their children to school'. Additionally, Atik mentioned that 'the welfare program for poor families focused only for people who are registered in the database of Social Affairs Ministry.' Consequently, there are many local fishers lacking the understanding of the social security and it has made them live in poverty in Bone District.

Instead of the state providing protection and guaranteeing the right to defend land as a place for fishers to live, the land certificate program has not run optimally. Cahaya confirmed that the fishers' housing looks rundown, and the program for granting land certificates is also hindered by conflicts of interest among local elites. When visiting the fishing area in Bone, we will witness local fishers' settlements that are inaccessible from the standard of eligibility for a house as a place to live. In this condition, as short as the researchers made observations, it turned out that the house renovation program, which was the focus of the state, did not reach the local fishers (*Unpublished observation*). Thus, a decent place to live is still a dynamic problem and is faced directly by local seafarers in Bone District.

As an effort to provide social protection, the state is present by providing the e-Kusuka program. However, this program is still ridden with productivist values in social service mechanisms. As Ahsan confirmed, 'the e-Kusuka-based social service program only provides assistance to meet the needs for fishing equipment'. This means that the service program is only for fishing productivity, such as diesel fuel subsidies, as well as buying fish catch and various types of fishing boat equipment. The mechanism of universalism in social services for fishing communities does not appear as part of welfare universalism. It raises an assumption that local fishers do not need the presence

of the state in realizing social welfare. Uba said, 'e-Kusuka is not running effectively because the program is only a social protection card that is in the form of material assistance for the needs of fishers.' For this reason, social protection mechanisms for fishermen do not appear to be part of the universalism of welfare-state provision.

The social affairs office in Bone as the leading sector does not guarantee universal welfare for fishers. The researchers only found Joint Business Group (*Kelompok Usaha Bersama – KUBE*) with community priorities in the mainland area, without any initiative to designate the right program for stewards. Asna stated that 'so far, the program has only been for the productive age group to carry out government programs through productive businesses.' All beneficiaries of the program cover fostered groups, who are administratively registered in the Social Affairs Ministry database. 'Even though the Fisheries Office also provides an assistance program in the form of assisting the transfer of technology for fish catches, it does not touch the families and fishers who have been working at sea', said Febi. 'Recipients of this technology transfer assistance are around 100 groups to produce processed fish products, such as canned floss, preparations for restaurants, and others', said Andi. Furthermore, the Labor Office has not provided guidance to the fishers. This is proven by the absence of fishers in the pre-employment program at the Vocational Training Center (*Balai Latihan Kerja – BLK*) initiated by the local government (*Unpublished observations*). Thus, stakeholders who are supposed to provide social security to improve welfare do not prioritize fishers as part of the program.

So far, the social insurance model for fishers uses traditional mechanisms. Andi said that fishers' fees for the insurance program are still independently paid—the amount of which is IDR 16,200 per month, so each fisher has to pay around IDR 194,400 per year. The insurance mechanism is managed independently by the local fishers' association. Every fisher who experiences a sea tragedy and dies will get around IDR 40,000,000. This insurance manager is a local organization named Local Fisher Community Group (Pokmawas).

Based on the challenges above, all of these phenomena occur due to the dysfunction of fishers' associations in controlling welfare programs for fishers. The researchers have noted that there are three associations—the Indonesian Fishermen Association (*Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia – HNSI*) in Bone District Branch, the Farmers and Fishermen Association (*Himpunan Masyarakat Tani dan Nelayan – HMTN*) and *Teluk Bajoe* of Fishermen's Union (*Serikat Nelayan Teluk Bajoe – SNTB*)—whose functions include advocacy, empowerment, and gathering of fishers, that do not run optimally (see Table 2). This happened due to weak human resources, conflicts of interest, and no local heroes. It was confirmed by Haji, who said that 'the local fishers' association is not active, so there are many activities that should advocate the interests of fishers who are not working properly. For example, when there are complaints from the public about diesel fuel, we have to wait between 7-10 days to go out to sail,' he said. Conflicts of interest also arise in the process of increasing welfare for fishers, 'they are all just on the table, no one goes to the field', stated Idris. This proves that

the interests of certain groups still occur in the process of changing policies for the protection and welfare of fishers. As such, the dysfunction of fishers' associations indicates a weakness in the awareness of social groups in advocating and transforming issues concerning the livelihoods of fishers.

In short, fishers' social protection in the local context of Bone District has found a unique welfare system. The welfare state, which has changed from productivism to universalism, seems imperfect in the context and issues of the welfare of fishers' groups. So far, the welfare state has covered all elements of social groups, but the implementation has yet to be optimal. Aside from the problem of local governments not understanding the ethical values of the welfare state, the issue of the tug-of-war of government interests has become a crucial aspect in the re-launch of universalism. Therefore, the signs of improvement in fishers' lives in Bone District are still far away or even still trapped in policies of segmented practices.

4.2. Economic monopoly and Unregulated Maritime Policies.

The number of fishing vessels is estimated to be around 1,500 types. Each ship is owned by a *Ponggawa*. According to Rahman, 'a *Ponggawa* has around 10 to 20 fishing boats.' Each ship is also ensured to have a fishing group consisting of a captain, crew members, and mechanics. The average number of fishers in each boat is between 8–10 people for medium-sized boats, and 10–20 people for large boats. Each group of fishers who go to sea spends a budget of between IDR 10,000,000 and IDR 25,000,000. Fishers do not own the cost of production at sea, but they have to borrow or be financed by *Ponggawa*. This fishing business practice then results in an economic monopoly that causes fishers to not be able to do much to earn greater economic income.

Although the number of fish caught in one go to sea can generate income between IDR 50,000,000–IDR 80,000,000, 'the income from selling fish earned by fishers ranges from only IDR 1,000,000 to IDR 2,000,000', said Askar. Moreover, the practice of auctioning fish is not as expected by society in general. According to Ahsan, 'the practice of selling fish occurs in the middle of the sea before the fishers returned to the mainland', he said. They will sort the fish between high and low quality. Some of the high-quality fish will be sorted and brought directly to Mika-Makassar, and the low-quality fish will be brought to the mainland at the fish auction site. As it turned out, the *Ponggawa* had compromised with the big businessmen in Makassar so that the fish caught and sold in the Bone area was of low quality—'this caused the selling power of the fish to be quite low', mentioned Ahsan. This practice is often also known as economic monopoly by some *Ponggawa*.

The local fishers had faced the limit of authority between the Fish Auction Place (*Tempat Pelelangan Ikan – TPI*) and the Fish Catching Management (*Pengelolaan Penangkapan Ikan – PPI*) in the form of a local company. Representatives of the Bone District Fisheries Office stated in an interview that 'TPI in the Bajoe bay area is under the authority of the local government.' Meanwhile, 'PPI is the authority of the provincial government', said Andi. In addition, according to fish traders,

'this situation makes fishers and fish sellers in the TPI area powerless to sell high-quality fish', said Jasmi. PPI functions as a place to sort export-quality fish and is carried out by factories in the local area. There are about 10 workers in the factory. They work to select fish as an ingredient for export to foreign countries, as well as to sell to local societies across the provinces of Indonesia. As such, fish auctioned at TPI are of low quality as a result of sorting for export products; this makes local fishers lack better income inputs.

The sea area covers around 1.022,21 kilometers; in fact, it has uncertainty in welfare provision. There are fish trap habitats that are directly facing the main road of commerce and spices. Empirically, local fishers have access to only 138 kilometers of the area. According to Andi, 'not all of the marine area is allowed to be accessed by local fishers because there are certain boundaries.' Should they violate the rules, they would be punished by the local government with a fee, and even imprisonment. Indeed, the regulations for operations of fishing areas are enacted by the central government. It is difficult for the local officials to advocate for expanding the fishing trap zones because of the conflicts of interest between local and central governments.

Local fishers in Bone still use traditional fishing gears. Each group of fishers must have *Rumpon* [a type of fishing aid installed at sea] to ensure fishing zoning. If they do not have *Rumpon*, fish are very difficult to catch and every fisher must also have a special zone in each area. Ahsan revealed that, 'every time I go to sea, I must have at least 2 to 7 houses as a sign of the area where the group catches. If you do not comply with this zoning alone, conflicts can arise between fishers.' Each *Rumpon* that is thrown as fishing net has a maximum area of one million; when they have seven *Rumpon* then the fishing ground is only controlled by a maximum of seven million. This fishing gear or sign costs around IDR 10,000,000–IDR 14,000,000. With high prices, they have to set aside part of their income to save money so they can buy *Rumpon*. Meanwhile, a *Rumpon* is usually used only once, and if it breaks, a fisher has to buy a new one. The sad thing is, if the marine environment is not good enough to cause fishing not to meet the target, the fishers have to borrow capital from the *Ponggawa*.

Even though the Indonesian government has issued Law No. 32 of 2014, in fact, maritime affairs in certain areas still have various problems. Moreover, the marine conservation policy based on the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Regulation No. 31 of 2020, the existence of Indonesia's exclusive economic zone regulations has prevented the Bone waters from being maximized. Andi confirmed that, 'the local government has proposed a marine conservation area, but the central government has not yet agreed.' For this reason, maritime policy in Bone District, Tanete Riattang Timur Subdistrict, has yet to show any changes towards welfare for local fishers.

Economic monopolies, regulatory authorities, fishing areas, and marine conservation are still not regulated in local maritime policies. This creates ambivalence for fishers in realizing welfare based on rights. This situation cannot be denied that the hegemony of power in the presence of patron-clients between *Ponggawa-Sawi* and cruise companies has perpetuated patrimo-

nial practices, colonialism, and injustice in creating equal distribution of income among fishers. As long as maritime regulations have not been configured in accordance with the needs of local fishermen, the welfare of fishermen is still uncertain. Therefore, policy segmentation must be changed by taking into account the needs of local fishers based on universalist perspectives.

4.3. *Tikkengtolo Tradition: Between Survival and Powers.*

The fishing community in Bone has faced uncertain social welfare. As a spice and trade route area in the Makassar Sea, local fishers from Bone still apply a mechanism of power relations in the process of going to sea, causing them to be trapped by traditional welfare production. Even though the accumulation of income per person in one go at sea is quite high, disparities still exist in the region. Based on observational records, researchers see this gap occurring for two reasons (*Unpublished observations*). First, there is a power relationship between *Ponggawa* (local capital owners) and *Sawi* (fishing workers). Fishers' welfare has not reflected equality because they have to pay quite high for ship operations while at sea to the capital provider. 'Usually, we have to pay around 60% of the total initial capital loan,' said Askar. This situation makes fishers unable to be economically independent and will always depend on *Ponggawa*. Second, the friction between *Ponggawa* and *Cato* (owners of small capital) makes fishers powerless. It makes fishers always depend on the two categories of capital owners. As stated by Kahar,

“... We would go out to fish in the sea, but always borrow money as initial capital from Pak Haji Z [*Cato*]. This is a basic need when going to sea because we need around IDR 10,000,000 for one trip ...”

This traditional fishing economic system has been going on for hundreds of years, said Idris in an interview session. However, the economic system traps local fishers to be able to rise independently in improving their welfare. LS confirmed that the *Ponggawa-Sawi* relationship functions as a formal and informal institution in fishers' business practices. As formal institutions, *Ponggawa* capitalize on fishing activities while informal institutions provide bailout funds for families who will be left out to sea by fishers. This relationship makes them trapped in the power relationship between *Ponggawa-Sawi*, 'including in the fish auction process', said Askar. Moreover, there is also stigmatization for the Bajoe fisher group, which makes them isolated by the local culture. Bajoe tribes, as indigenous fishers, seem to have no dream of being independent and prosperous. 'The Bajoe people do not have dreams, and that is what differentiates them from the Bugis', said Sabari. This statement is counterproductive to what [indigenous Bajoe tribe] local communities conveyed. 'It is as if he feels and lives in the bodies of neglected people, whose lives are living on that bamboo bridge,' said Idris. This stigma prevents the original fishers from Bone from increasing their welfare.

Another issue arises in the business model of local fishers. The practice of fishers so far is still stuck in the *Tikkengtolo* tra-

dition [catching tied fish]. The relationship between *Ponggawa-Sawi* makes the business of selling fish in the auction area not running effectively. 'This practice has been going on for more than the last three decades, where the sale of fish actually occurs before it goes to the mainland,' said Haji. The fish caught by fishers have been sorted in the middle of the sea before the fishers return to land. This practice makes the Fish Auction Place owned by the local government not function optimally. It means that local traders cannot sell quality fish in which they only accept low quality fish scraps, and others will nominally decrease in market price. As a fishmonger (*Uba*) put it,

“I should pay a levy of around IDR 3,000 to the local officers and I usually needs capital to buy a banded fish between IDR 30,000 and IDR 50,000. I have to spend a minimum capital of IDR 300,000 with a net profit from IDR 50,000 to IDR 200,000. Actually, the price of fish sold can be higher than usual, but it's that way because I only get the leftovers after the fish catch was sold in the middle of the sea by *Ponggawa*.”

To conclude, local fishers have always depended on *Ponggawa* and *Cota* because they have to provide initial budgets before leave following fishing catch, a minimum of between IDR 10,000,000 and IDR 15,000,000. The fund depends on the type of fishing group (see more details in **Figure 2**). With this capital, fishers must carry out the process of auctioning fish in the middle of the sea. This is a monopoly practice that represents *Ponggawa's* hegemony in business practices. Fish catches are not auctioned or brought to the market, but are brought directly forwarded to the *Kima* company in Makassar. Meanwhile, the members of *Sawi* only get the leftovers from the sea auction in the form of *bale* (leftovers). This means that, as said by Idris, "fish that is brought to the mainland to be marketed at the fish auction place is the result of sorting that does not qualify for quality."

5. Discussion.

The research discovered the important findings within the scheme of social protection for local fishers. This finding shows that the welfare provision is still productivist in nature, taking the form of fishing equipment. Sumarto (2020) argued that the productivist outlooks have been unable to fulfill basic needs for individuals' well-being. According to Yuda (2019) and Park and Jung (2007), productivist models are not able to give individual rights as welfare-state production. Analyzing this with existing studies, the dynamics of social protection are absorbed in the conflicts of interest between the local and central governments. This indicated that the welfare production is taken advantage of for certain political interests during leadership transitions. The fishers' associations also have not optimally protected the local labor through advocacy at the grassroots level. In other words, Muhtadi (2015) and Ufen (2015) revealed that dysfunctional groups are caused by political compromises between national and local elites. According to Aspinall (2014), this model of compromise is common in countries with rudimentary democracy, so the tug-of-war of elite interests makes

the welfare system influenced by political elites and oligarchic actors. One form of the oligarchic system, as stated by Vallier (2019), is that superior programs in improving social welfare have always been tools of legitimacy or political campaigns for certain circles.

Formulation of maritime policies to support the improvement of individual well-being, in fact, is trapped by conflicts of interest of oligarchic actors and economic monopoly. There are power relations between Ponggawa-Sawi and the invisible hand in selling practices for export quality have created a dilemma in the reformulation of policies on universal social care. Heupner (2021) highlights that the hegemony of power has triggered intimidation, operation, and full power to fulfill of social care for certain groups including fishing workers. The social protection without equality patterns, unequal division of roles, positive moral ideas, and rights-based will lead to disparities in development goals (Jakimow et al., 2019; Olken, 2019). Moreover, social advocacy from the grassroots to solve the problems of certain groups such as fishing workers who need protection will continue to spread in the diaspora (Khuluq et al., 2022). The fact about the limits of authority between the center and the regions in managing TPI is still a crucial issue. Marine protected area policies that do not work due to the apathy of the state in managing and developing marine potential are still blocking the access to social service and protection programs. This happens because the local government does not have full power in managing marine protected areas, especially in budgeting management. Therefore, Indonesia needs a sound maritime policy strategy to regulate maritime urgency as stipulated in the law, that land, water, and everything in it is controlled by the state, and used for the welfare and prosperity of the people (Suseto et al., 2019).

The innovation of technology in maritime sectors has grown faster than the fishers' skills. In contrast, the locals are used to traditional ways of catching fish, causing fishing technologies to have not been optimally utilized. Locals cannot optimally be reached by social services that used technological approaches. For instance, *Tikkengtolo* tradition was an alternative way practiced by the local fishers. Although such tradition was based on locals' independence, it has prevented fishers from unlocking greater potential at sea. As an impact, local fishers' was unfavorable to increase of the rate productivity in fishing trap. Bolt and Lashley (2015) and Ariza-Montes et al. (2021) revealed that technological innovations at a corporate level must involve recruitment of new crew members, which is decided upon management's sensitivity for increasing of job productivity. Indeed, the locals should adapt to innovations, such as by increasing job skills and employee-focused soft skills.

Conclusions.

The mechanism for protection and welfare for local fishers is still not optimal because of it is divided into two opposite points. On the one hand, this happened because of the hegemony of power in developing special areas, such as natural and marine potential in the sea area of Bone. On the other hand, this is caused by the economic monopoly of both large and small

enterprises. Large enterprises use a specific operating system to run their business at the local level, and at the same time entrust people who have capital, such as the Ponggawa group, with the business. Meanwhile, small entrepreneurs (Ponggawa) have become a scourge for fishers because of the patron-client system of power relations for centuries. Meanwhile, the local government is still trapped in the patrimonial legacy as a long-term impact of past colonialism. This situation makes the social protection and welfare system that should be oriented towards family-centered values not happen because the welfare assistance program is still productivist in nature. This problem, of course, is not directly related to welfare-state provision as part of universalism. Moreover, empowerment of local fishers is still centered on direct services, which are effective in improving well-being. As an implication, this research shows that the social protection system for fishers is still intertwined with a liberal economic system that benefits certain parties—it turns even more absurd amid an imperfect democracy in a developing country like Indonesia.

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